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WITTERS (blind theology student)Cert to S. Ct. Wash. (Pearson; 
Ros.s,conc; Utter,diss) 
v. 
WASHINGTON COMM'N FOR BLIND State/Civ Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Resp provides tuition money for blind 
college students. Petr was denied tuition money because he 
was studying to be a minister or church youth leader. The 
wash. s. Ct. held that providing petr tuition would violate 
- 2 -
the Establishment Clause, and denying petr's request :1for aid 
would not impair his free exercise rights. 
2. FACTS AND HOLDINGS BELOW: Petr meets the eligibility 
requirements under resp's program whereby blind college 
students receive money as "vocational assistance." 1 This aid 
is available whether the blind student wishes to attend public 
or private colleges, even if the colleges are affiliated with 
a church. Petr was enrolled in a joint degree program at the 
Inland Empire School of the Bible and at Whitworth College. 
He was to receive a biblical studies degree from the former 
and a B.A. from the latter. Both schools are apparently 
properly accredited. Petr intended to become a minister or 
church youth director. When petr applied for the aid resp 
denfed it, and adopted a policy statement that said: "The 
washington State Constitution forbids the use of public funds 
to assist an individual in the pursuit of a career or degree 
in theology or related areas." 
1The aid program apparently provides tuition funds and other 
financial assistance. Wash Rev. Code § 74.16.181 states in part: 
"The commission [resp] may maintain or cause to be 
maintained a program of services to assist visually 
handicapped persons to overcome vocational handicaps 
and to obtain the maximum degree of self-support and 
self-care •..• Under such program the commission may: ... 
(3) provide for special education and/or training in 
the professions, business or trades under a vocational 
rehabilitation plan, and if the same cannot be obtained 
within the state, provisions shall be made for such 
purposes outside the state. Living maintenance during 
the period of such education and/or training within or 
without the state may be furnished." 




Petr brought suit, and the lower court affirmed resp on 
the basis of the state constitution. The Wash. S. Ct., 
however, affirmed solely on the basis of the federal 
constitution. The Wash. S. Ct. gave a straightforward 
application of the Lemon test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 
602, 612 (1971), and found a secular purpose, but held that 
the aid to petr would have a sectarian effect. The Wash. S. 
Ct. did not address entanglement. The s. Ct. also stated that 
denial of aid to petr did not violate the Free Exercise Clause 
because the State was not coercing petr to change or modify 
his beliefs, nor did the State impose an affirmative burden 
upon religious beliefs. For this proposition the S. Ct. cited 
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 u.s. 707 (1981). Finally, the S. 
Ct. rejected in short order the Equal Protection claim brought 
by petr. 
Justice Rosellini concurred on state grounds and Justice 
Utter filed a dissent. Justice Utter agreed that the Lemon 
test controlled, but he stressed the cases like Hunt v. 
McNair, 413 u.s. 734 (1974) and Roemer v. Board of Public 
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), which dealt with aid to higher 
education. The Supreme Court appears satisfied that these 
institutions are not as permeated with religion as secondary 
and primary schools. Justice Utter argued that the state 
statute did not have a sectarian effect. Only a miniscule 
percentage of recipients would use the money for religiously-
oriented vocational training. Nondiscriminatory aid to such 
students does not give any imprimatur of state approval. The 
' ,.l • 
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primary effect of the statute was to help blind students find 
jobs, not to aid religion. 
Justice Utter also argued that denying funds to petr 
would violate his free excercise rights. This was pure 
discrimination against petr because of his religious beliefs. 
Moreover, states are required to accomodate religion. As the 
Supreme Court held in Thomas, supra, at 717-718: 
"Where the state conditions receipt of an 
important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a 
religious faith, or where it denies such a 
benefit because of conduct mandated by 
religious belief, thereby putting substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior 
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon 
religion exists." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that providing him with aid 
would not violate the Establishment Clause. Moreover, denying 
him aid because of his religious beliefs violates his free 
exercise rights. On the first issue petr points out that the 
GI Bill of Rights for decades has funded the theological 
studies of GI's who sought to become ministers, priests, and 
rabbis. This Washington program is no different. This state 
program is not designed to aid religion, but one blind 
student's request for aid was denied because of the 
Constitution. The Establishment Clause should prevent state 
programs designed to aid religion; it should not prevent one 
recipient from receiving aid because of his vocational plans. 
Second, petr's free exercise rights have been injured by this 
excessive application of the Establishment Clause. 
Petrs brief generally cites cases such as Lynch v. 




11 Ct. 3062 (1983) for the proposition that the Establisfument 
Clause should not be read as broadly as the Washington S. Ct. 
did in its opinion. 
4. DISCUSSION: The holding in this case is rather 
suspect. The aid program at issue here was not designed, and 
hardly ever operated, to assist religion; even if one applies 
the chameleon-like Lemon test it certainly stretches things to 
say that the aid program has a primary sectarian effect. 
Moreover, the small amount of aid at issue here related to 
post-secondary education, and this Court has been cautious in 
striking down aid to religious colleges and college students. 
See Hunt, supra. The federal government has shown no 
hesitancy in aiding religious education. Petr is correct that 
the GI Bill of Rights provided financial aid to theological 
students, and throughout the late 1800's the federal 
government provided millions of dollars in aid to religious 
education on Indian reservations. 
Petr's free exercise claim is somewhat difficult but is 
more interesting. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 u.s. 618 (197~) 
this Court was divided on why a Tennessee statute requiring 
clergymen to leave the clergy as a condition of holding state 
office was unconstitutional. Until petr applied for aid the 
program at issue gave money to all blind students for study at 
any college, public or private, sectarian or nonsectarian. 
The fact that petr wanted to be a minister disqualified him 




his case. Under the Paty plurality opinion, this may not 
violate petr's free exercise rights. See id. at 626 - 627. 
I suggest that this petn is worthy of a CFR. The issues 
are squarely presented, although the briefing is not good. A 
response may assist the Court in deciding whether it is ready 
once again to debate the church/state issue. --------
I recommend CFR. No response. 
Feb. 12, 1984 Jung Op. in Pet. 
Court ................... . "Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .............. . .... , 19 .. . Assigned ................. . , 19 .. . 
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No. 84-1070, Witters v. Washington Department of Services 
for the B.lind (Supreme Court of Washington) 
Memorandum to File: 
This case comes to us in a curious posture. Petitioner, a 
young blind man, was studying to become a minister or a Christian 
youth director at a nondenominational Christian scho~i~h~ 
-\ 
State of Washington. The state had a vocational rehabilitation 
program administered by respondent, the State Department of 
Services for the Blind (herein called the Department) • The 
program was funded by federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 (80 per cent) and by the state itself. When petitioner 
first sought financial assistance from the Department, he was 
enrolled in the three-year program of the School for the Blind, 
' but later changed to a four-year program lead1ng to a BA Degree 
from Whitworth College, a private presbyterian school. Petitioner's 
purpose remained the same: to prepare for a career as a minister, 
missionary or church youth director. 
The Department denied petitioner's application for financial 
assistance because of its view that the 11 Washington Constitution 
forbids the use of public funds to assist an individual in the 
pursuit of a career in theology .. , quoting from the Department's 
policy statement. Respondent's denial was upheld on administrative 
review and on judicial review in the State Superior Court. At each 
No. 84-1070 2. 
stage in this review process, respondent relied only on the 
State Constitution and it made no claim that a grant of benefits 
would violate the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of 
Washington, however, (5 to 2) affirmed respondent's decision to 
deny financial assistance but based its decision solely on the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment - not on the State 
Constitution. It applied the three-part test of Lemon. It agreed 
that the program had a "secular purpose", but found that the 
"principal or primary effect of the aid would be to advance 
religion" contrary to the second part of the Lemon test. It 
reached this conclusion by focusing "on the particular aid sought 
by the petitioner" rather than on the vocational rehabilitation 
program as a whole. No decision was made by the Court as to 
rl.A.. 
"excessive entanglement", as QC record did not provide an adequate 
factual basis. The Court did say, however, that the "entanglement 
inquiry is ill-suited to this case". As the SG notes, the "only 
issue addressed by the Washington Supreme Court was the Federal 
Establishment Clause. Thus, the correctness of its decision is 
the only issue before this Court. The SG states the question 
substantially as follows: 
"Whether the Establishment Clause requires a 
state to deny financial assistance for the 
education of a blind person who is otherwise 
eligible under the state's vocational 
rehabilitation program solely because the 
handicapped applicant intends to study for a 
church oriented career". 
No. 84-1070 
' . 
I' l 3. 
The principal briefs in this case are quite good: briefs 
by petitioner, respondent (by The Attorney General of Washington}, 
and the amicus brief of the SG. There are a number of amicus 
briefs on each side of the issue. There seems to be agreement 
that the program on its face is neutral, and that its purpose is 
to assist blind people in obtaining training and finding employment. 
Petitioner therefore argues that the primary effect of the program 
is not to advance religion but quite simply to enable handicapped 
persons obtain appropriate training to make a living. Both the 
petitioner and the SG emphasize that the aid program is for the 
benefit of individual students - not for the benefit of any 
religious institution. The error of the state court was its focus 
solely on petitioner's training as a minister as a basis for its 
primary effect conclusion. Rather, the purpose of the program as 
a whole must be examined, and its effect upon religion - if any -
is incidental. Petitioner therefore argues that the decision 
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by 
discriminating against petitioner solely because of his choice 
of a religious rather than some other type of career. 
The Attorney General of Washington, conceding that he would 
have preferred to defend the validity of the State Constitution, 
finds himself in the role of defending the Federal Constitution. 
He noted that the record is "sparse" because petitioner's claim 
No. 84-1070 4. 
was denied at the outset. Nevertheless, and in the absence of 
record support, The Attorney General focuses on the 11 nature and 
operation11 of the program as a whole. He says the program, a 
federally assisted vocational rehabilitation program, is not 
like the GI Bill or other general federal scholarship and student 
aid programs. In making this distinction, The Attorney General 
says that under this vocational rehabilitation program an 
11 individualized11 judgment must be made in each case with respect 
to the skills and aptitudes of the applicant, what type of program 
the individual wishes to enter, and the specific type of job the 
individual wants. All of these evaluations must be made by the 
state before it spends money on a specific individual. He compares 
this individualization with the GI Bill of Rights that 11 requires 
none of these sorts of governmental evaluations and judgments ... 
In support of this argument, The Attorney General devotes 
considerable space in his brief to quoting from The Federal 
Rehabilitation Act and regulations adopted thereunder. 
The SG, without having seen The Attorney General's brief, 
argues that because the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Washington casts doubt upon the validity of 11 several major federal 
programs 11 , the United States has a 11 compelling interest 11 in 
reversing the decision. A number of programs administered by the 
Veteran's Administration and Department of Education are described 
in the SG's brief. He emphasizes particularly the GI Bill and 
~. ,. 
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the several types of student grants and loans under the Pell Grant 
Program. In addition, the Veterans' Administration provides 
support to veterans with service related disabilities, including 
blindness and makes no distinction on the basis of religion. 
The SG agrees - although the record does not make clear - that the 
state program appears to be funded under the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, the purpose of which is to be provide grants to states "to 
meet the current and future needs of handicapped individuals, so 
that such individuals may prepare for and engage in gainful 
employment to the extent of their capabilities." See 29 u.s.c. 
720(a). Perhaps the SG's basic argument is the distinction between 
government assistance to institutions and government assistance to 
individual students wholly without regard to their religion, 
irreligion, or career choice - if any. 
The briefs of the parties and the SG rely on numerous decisions 
of this Court, often finding support for their contending views 
in the same decision. In this memorandum, I will not get into a 
discussion of cases. I do note that petitioner relies on a summary 
affirmance of a three judge court decision that may merit taking a 
look at. This is Americans United for Separation of Church 
lA-~ 
and State v. Blanton, 433 Fed. Supp. 97 (1977), a Tennessee program .., 
was before the DC that provided state assistance equally to secular 
and religious students - specifically financial aid to college 
No. 84-1070 
students "solely on the basis of a student's financial need." 
Id. at 99, 104-105. This Court summarily affirmed Blanton. 
434 u.s. 803 (1977) - an affirmance we regard normally as a 
precedent of substantial weight. 
* * * 
I will be interested in my clerk's views. There is 
language in decisions of this Court that no doubt can be read 
as supporting either side in this case. I would like for my 
clerk to avoid an extended review of our numerous decisions. 
6. 
Rather, it would be helpful to focus on the most relevant holdings, 
and particularly whether the weight of authority supports the SG's 
view as to the distinction between neutral aid to an individual 
(such as a scholarship or loan program) and institutional aid such 
as grants to schools directly or indirectly. I do not think the 
Establishment Clause cases decided at the last Term of Court are 
relevant. I am inclined to think that this is a Free Exercise 
case, and to believe - at least tentatively - that the Washington 
Supreme Court erred. I find it difficult to believe that the First 
11~~ hll 1 a fUl Jrt:::t=WV assJ.stance, on a w o y neutra 
"'\ 
Amendment would prevent 
~ 
basis, to persons who attend a religious school. One of the 
""' problems with such a view is in determining what is a religious 
No. 84-1070 7. 
school. In my state, for example, I believe all of the private 
colleges (for example, Washington & Lee University, University of 
Richmond, Hampden-Sydney College and Randolph-Macon College) were 
founded and supported for many decades by particular religious 
denominations. The briefs of both parties rely on history, 
going back to Madison and Jefferson who - I believe - would be 
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'Ib: Justice Powell November 2, 1985 
From: Bill 
Re: Witters v. Washington Department of Services 
for the Blind, No. 84-1070 
Cert to the Washington Supreme Court 
Argument date: November 6, 1985 
Questions Presented 
~es the Establishment Clause prohibit a state from using 
a vocational rehabilitation program to pay for the religious 









would the state's refusal to fund the handicapped 
student's religious training violate the Free Exe~cise Clause, 
1'1 
where the state funds non-religious education? 
Statement of Facts 
~tr Larry Witters is a young blind man who is enrolled in 
a four-year Bachelor of Arts program at Inland Empire School of 
fue Bible in Spokane, Washington. Witters plans to go into the 
ministry. 
Pursuant to Revised Code of wash. Chapter 74.16, Witters 
applied 
relevant 
for educational assistance from respondent. Under 
provisi£n~~o1J~i;~ 5 zed to maintain 
the 
"a 
program of services 
~ ~ 
to assist visually handicapped persons to 
~ercome vocational handicaps and to obtain the maximum degree of 
self-support and self-care." As part of this program respondent 
nay "[p] rovide for special edcuation and/or training in the 
professions, business or trades under a vocational rehabilitation 
plan." Revised Code of Wash. 74.16.181. 
The state TC found that petr satisfied the physical 
eligibility requirements of the state's program. Joint App 7. 
Nevertheless, respondent denied petr's application for 
assistance, solely on the ground that providing such assistance 
would violate the state constitution's establishment clause. 1 
Respondent's Deputy Director acknowledged that 
respondent "would pay for Larry Witters' training if he 
wanted to be a JComml!!li§...t._ ~_tiatg:t if there was a job 
available aftrer s~ainTng,~ that payments to train 
him to be a pastor were illegal." Stipulation, Joint App 
6. 
Petr appealed that decision to the Spokane County ,superior Court 







That court also affirmed, but on the basis of the federal 
establishment clause.~>., The court concluded that the aid statute 
plainly had a secular purpose, but that its ~t was to ~ 
aid religion in this case. See App to Petn for Cert A-8 to A-10; ~f. 
~
Hunt v. McNair, 413 u.s. 734, 742-743 (1973). Because the court 
found that "our state constitution requires a far stricter 
separation of church and state than the federal constitution," tf;#-Q 
. ~~-
J.pp to Petn for Cert A-2, the court found 1 t unnecessary to ~;;~ 




Although that should have ended the case, the court went j)-z.:J 
on to decide that the denial of aid did not violate the federal ?'> thl-
Free Exercise Clause. The court reasoned that "[t] he :_ 
11 --------- ~ Commission's decision may make it difficult, or even impossible,  
fbr appellant to become a minister, but this is beyond the scope~ 
c£ the free exercise clause." !d., at A-16. ~~~ 
..Ustice _ otter_ dissented. He argued that the state's :~ 
I' "' program operated neutrally to assist handicapped students, and 
fuerefore could not be said to have the primary effect of aiding 
religion. He further argued that petr 's freedom to pursue his 
chosen religious career was impermissibly burdened by the state's 
denial of aid, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 






1. Establishment Clause 
Both the Washington Supreme Court and the parties apply 
the Lemon v. Kurtzman three-part test. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 
105 s.ct. 2479, 2493-2494 (1985) (POWELL, J., concurring) 
tharacterizing Lemon's test as "the only coherent test a 
mjority of the Court has ever adopted"). My analysis of how 
that test applies here follows. 
A. Secular Purpose 
The state statute is unconstitutional if it does not have 
a "clearly secular purpose." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 2490. 
'.nle washington Supreme Court found that this prong of the Lemon 
test was easily satisfied by the aid program. No party disputes 
that conclusion, which seems obviously sensible. E.g., Grand 
~pids School District v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3223 (1985). 
B. Primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits 
religion 2 
2 Petr argues that this issue (and for that matter the 
entire Establishment Clause analysis) is governed by the 
Cburt • s summary affirmance of Americans United for 
~paration of Church and State v. Blanton, 433 F. Supp. 97 
(M.D. Tenn.) (three-judge panel), aff'd, 434 u.s. 803 
(1977). I'm not sure that's the case. VBlanton upheld the 
~~ validit of a Gl Bi 1-t e state scholarshi ro ram, but 
the t ree-J u ge pane expressly based its conclusion on 
~ the fact that the state aid could be spent on "many 
.... ~ ~ ~.t.-4 personal needs" as well as direct educational expenses 
~"'.-:~ .. like tuition. 433 F. Supp., at 101. 1 haven't found 
- (Footnote continued) 
The Washington Supreme Court found that the aid program, 
Gli~ 
I 
would have the primary eff~~ct of aiding 
religion, and was therefore impermissible under the Establishment 
Clause. Petr and the SG argue that the court answered the wrong 
question. The real issue, they argue, is whether the aid program 
~~had the primary effect of advancing religion. 
1. Scope of the effect ( ~~~ w-JA) 
fetr and the SG are right: the Court should look to the ~ 
effect of the aid program as a whole. 
. . v 
p:nnt IS Mueller v. Allen, 463 u.s. 388 
The crucial case on this 
(1983). In that case, 
the Court sustained a Minnesota law that permitted parents to 
deduct various educational expenses (including tuition) fran 
fueir taxable income. In analyzing the "primary effect" of the 
challenged statute, the Court did not look to the impact of the 
~x deduction on the parents, named as defendants, who deducted 
the expenses of sending their children to sectarian schools. 
Rather, the Court analyzed the statute's effect as a whole: 
Most importantly, the deduction is available for 
roucational expenses incurred by ~arents, including 
those whose children attend public schools and tho~ 
\'hose children attend nonsectarian private schools or 
~ctarian private schools. Just as in Widmar v. 
\incent, 454 u.s. 263, 274 (1981), where we concluded 
that the State's provision of a forum neutrally 
'available to a broad class of nonreligious as well ~ 
(Footnote 2 continued from previous page) 
\ .. 
anything in the record that states whether aid money may 
~ spent on personal needs in this case. In any event, 
because I think this Court's written decisions show that 
fue Washington aid program is permissible, I do not rely 
m Blanton. -- ---
religious speakers' does not 'confer any imprimatur of 
state approval,' ibid., so here: '[t] he provision of 
~nefits to so broad a spectrum of group$ is an 
:important index of secular effect.'" Ibid. ,,: 
463 u.s., at 397. The school-aid cases decided last term 
II ~ 
cimilarly looked to the overall effects of the challenged 
-------
~ograms when determining "primary effect." Grand Rapids School 
Iistr ict v. Ball, supra, at 3223. The only support for the 
narrower focus adopted by the Washington Supreme Court was a 
single sentence of dictum 413 u.s. 734, 742 
(1973) (POWELL, J., for the Court) ("To identify 'primary 
~feet,' we narrow our focus from the statute as a whole to the 
cnly transaction presently before us") • In Hunt, however, the 
Court was evaluatin 
.....____ 
state revenue bonds scheme by which schools could borrow at 
below-market rates). Such programs have consistently been 
treated differently from programs which sought to aid individual 
parents or students according to their own private choices. 
~mpare Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1971) with Mueller v. 
Allen, supra. Moreover, the program in Hunt satisfied the ----Establishment Clause, precisely because it dig-not primarily aid -religion even as to the transaction immediately before the Court. 
413 u.s., at 743-744 (college was not pervasively sectarian, and 
aid would not advance the religious activities in which it 
engaged) • Thus, the narrowed focus in Hunt was a short-cut: 
when the statute does not advance religion when applied to its 
religious beneficiaries, it cannot advance religion when viewed 
as a whole. 
2. Effect of the aid 
~~~-
program as a whole ~ 
The primary effect of washington's aid-t9-handicapped-
' 
&udents program, viewed as a whole, is not to advance religion . 
./ 
Uke Mueller, the program offers a benefit neutrally to all its 
/ 
mndicapped citizens. See also Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at 274; 
/ Cbrnrnittee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 782 n. 
38 (1973). Whether the benefit works to aid religion d~s I 
individual beneficiary, a wholly on the private choices of the -
critical factor in Mueller. 463 u.s., at 399. Moreover, there 
is nothing in the record that suggests that a large portion of 
the funds expended under this program go to students pursuin; 
religious training. Cf. id., at 391 (95% of private school 
~udents benefitting from tax program went to sectarian schools). 
For all these reasons, the Court has strongly implied 
that scholarships "'made available generally without regard to 
the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public, non-public nature of the 
~stitution benefited,'" are permissible under the Establishment 
Clause. Id., at 398 (quoting Nyquist, supra, at 783 n. 38). 
Your opinion for the Court in v Nyguist, in which the Court 
invalidated tuition grants to private school students, emphasized 
-tl '3~ ~,.. )? 7 g-;J ---
~ a long footnote that such scholarship programs (you mentioned 
~~---------------------------
the G.!. Bill as an example) are different from either direct 
,-----/ ~ 
< ~ants to religious institutions or tuition grants aimed at those 
------------------------.--. -
attending such institutions, because the scholarships subsidize 
SJch a wide variety of secular and nonsecular pursuits. 413 
u.s., at 782-783 n. 38. In Mueller, the Court analogized 
Minnesota's tax exemption to the scholarship programs you 
7 
mscussed in your Nyquist footnote. 463 u.s., at 398. This is 
I 
~ry close to a direct statement that such schola~~hip programs 
are constitutionally valid. 
That conclusion fits with one of the Court's chief 
concerns in Establishment Clause cases: aid to religious 
mstitutions. In the school cases, the Court has invalidated two 
kinds of state aid. First, the Court has consistently found that 
direct aid to church schools' religious activities is invalid. 
E.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1971) (invalidating 
provision that college could use federally funded buildings for 
religious purposes after 20 years). Second, the Court has 
invalidated aid to students and parents in circumstances where 
the aid was channeled overwhelmingly to pervasively religious 
schools. E.g., Nyquist, supra; Wolman v. Walter, 433 u.s. 429 
(1977) . This is the reason for distinguishing between tax 
credits offered solely to parents of children attending (largely 
sectarian) private schools, Nyquist, supra, and tax credits 
cffered to all parents of school-age children, as in Mueller. 
The former kind of aid seems like a subterfuge: it may appear 
~utral, but in fact its beneficiaries are almost always 
religious institutions. 
Not so with the aid program in this case. Here, the 
record does not show how much of the state's money would be used --- ____________.. 
to subsidize religious training if the state gave benefits to~ 
seminary students. It cannot be any more than a tiny amount, 
--··-·~------~-· ---· ·-·~ 
however; respondent appears to have adopted its no-aid-to-
religion-students policy in 1979. See J.A. 4. Petr applied for 
aid in 1979. Brief for Respondent 2. It appears likely that 
9. 
•' 
respondent • s policy was adopted in response to t~is particular 
case. If that is the case, there must not have been many 
potential beneficiaries who sought to use benefits for religious 
p.Irposes. Thus, the state's program has two characteristics 
~- --
which make it very difficult to characterize its effect as pro-
religion. ~ t~;r~a-m aids religion only in response to 
the individual choice of the beneficiary. The state does not 
offer the beneficiary any kind of subsidy or inducement to choose 
a religious over a non-religious pursuit. ~ the program 
reems in fact to aid mostly non-religious pursuits. These two 
points, in my view, require a finding that the program does not 
~imarily advance religion. 
3. State imprimatur of approval 
Respondent argues that, notwithstanding the neutrality of 
the program and its widespread application to secular education 
and training, the program cannot be used to subsidize religious 
training because it requires state oversight of the individual 
beneficiary. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (which sets 





of programs like 
an .I 'individualized --------
rehabilitation program" for each beneficiary. 29 u.s.c. -§72l(a) (9). This program is to be developed jointly by a sta~ 
counselor and the beneficiary. Id. §722. And the program itself 
is to be rev~wed an~ in order to see if the beneficiary is 
rreeting the objective goals that he and his counselor have set. 
ld. §722 (b) • Finally, the critical purpose of the training --
'. 
the reason for the state's generous funding -- is to prepare the 
J:eneficiary for employment. Id. §720. Responden~'~ argues, with 
~me force, that this scheme places the state in the position of 
advising beneficiaries whether to enter the ministry and of 
~termining whether they are making sufficient progress toward a 
religious career to justify continuing their aid. Although 
~tr 's personal decision to pursue a religious career does not 
carry any Establishment Clause concerns, when that decision is 
~ached jointly by petr and the state, it bears an imprimatur of 
state approval that is unacceptable. 
The difficulty with this argument is that there is nothing 
in the record that shows how the state administers the aid 
:r:rogram, since (1) petr was denied aid at the outset, and ( 2) 
both state courts decided that petr could not receive aid no 
------------~-------~----'-----~----~~------------------~,--~--~-natter how the program was administered. Lacking a record on -this issue, I don't see how the Court can conclude that the 
~ogram inherently places the state's imprimatur on petr's career 
choice. The state might choose to administer its program in a 
way that doesn't steer beneficiaries in any particular direction, 
but simply ensures that (1) their choice of training will lead bo 
employment, and ( 2) their academic progress is sufficient 
(measured in grades) to justify continued assistance. Neither of 
these concerns involves the state in petr 's choice to become a 
minister except in a very indirect way. Cf. Bender v. 
Williamsport School District, No. 84-773 (argued October 15, 
1985) (raising the question whether providing classrooms and 
faculty monitors placed the state's imprimatur of approval on 
religious club) • ' I 
' A different conclusion would necessarily be quite far-
reaching. If the government is not free to give any counseling 
that might affect whether petr goes into the ministry -- even 
though the counseling regards secular concerns like whether 
~tr's training will lead to a job -- then I wonder whether the 
military could offer career counseling to one who wishes to 
b:!come a chaplain, or whether a state caseworker could help a 
welfare recipient apply for jobs at churches. In both instances, 
the state offers a service neutrally to those who seek both 
secular and religious jobs. So too in this case. The danger, in 
each case, is not that the state is helping someone who wishes to 
follow a religious path, but that the state might get involved in 
individual religious decisions. (The welfare caseworker might, 
for example, urge beneficiaries to go into church work; or 
respondent's counselors might urge people like petr to become 
ministers.) That danger, it seems to me, depends on some kind of 
fuctual record. No such record exists here. 
I therefore recommend that the Court not hold that tre 
state program places its imprimatur on petr's decision to pursue 
a religious career. 
c. Excessive Entanglement 
~tr makes the same argument under the entanglement prong 
cf the Lemon test, and it fails for the same reason: there is 




program, as administered, involves the state in pri~ate religious 
decisions. For the reasons stated above, 1 don't believe the 
&ate program inherently involves the state in such decisions. 
There is an additional reason for concluding that the 
state aid program does not create any excessive entanglement 
between government and religion. The entanglement prong of 
Establishment Clause analysis has in the past been applied to 
&ate involvement in the administration of religious 
institutions, not to state involvement in individuals' personru ~ 
~cisions. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 615 (1971): Walz v. 
~x Commission, 397 u.s. 664 (1970). That distinction makes good 
sense. Laws which require government to oversee church 
operations raise a real danger of making churches the creature of 
the state (or vice versa). Laws which require government to 
interfere with personal religious decisions implicate a different 
interest altogether. That interest -- individual's interest in 
freedom of thought, see Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 u.s. 
624 ( 1943) -- is ordinarily thought to be protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause and not by the Establishment Clause. 
The real question raised by the state's procedures is 
whether petr's freedom to choose the path his conscience dictates 
has been interfered with by the state. There is no record on 
this question below. Because petr was denied the chance to 
receive aid, he never had to go through the entangling procedures 
respondent relies on. The Court should therefore hold that the 
state's counseling procedures do not implicate the Establishment 
Clause, and that this case does not present the question whether 
I 
those procedures infringe on free exercise of relig~~n • 
ll. .Free Exercise Clause ~ ~ /-~ 
The Establishment Clause question is whether the state ~ 
finance petr's education if it wishes to do so. The question 
t.nder the .Free Exercise clause is whether it must do so if it 
finances the education of other handicapped persons. The g; 
argues, quite rightly, that the Court need not reach the free 
exercise issue here. If the Court finds that the Washington 
fupreme Court erred in finding an Establishment Clause violation, 
the judgment below must be reversed. At that point, the 
W3.shington court could address the question whether the 
constitution bars giving petr the aid he requests. If the 
s_tate ~ 
state A-t- /.o 




exercise issue would properly be raised. If the Washington court 
found that the state constitution was not violated by the aid 
program, the free exercise issue would disappear. 
I find this argument persuasive. The Washington Supreme 
Court certainly hinted that it would reach the same result under 
its own constitution's establishment clause, but it didn't 
expressly so hold. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 u.s. 1032, 1038-
1042 (1983). Also, the dissent vigorously attacked the noticn 
that the state constitution barred aid to' seminary students. App 
to Petn for Cert B-26 to B-47. It's possible that, in light of 
the dissent's arguments and a decision from this Court on the 
federal Establishment Clause issue, the state court might 
consider the state constitutional issue afresh, and decide that 
fue aid is permissible. Therefore, it seems to me ,~hat the more 
prudent course would be to reverse on the Establishment Clause 
~sue and give the Washington Supreme Court a chance to 
explicitly decide the case under state law. 
If the Court decides instead to address the Free Exercise 
q.Iestion, I recommend reversal here as well. In McDaniel v. 
------- ~
lhty, 435 u.s. 618 (1978), the Court held that Tennessee could 
not bar ministers from serving in the state legislature. 
According to the Chief Justice's plurality opinion, Tennessee's 
restriction burdened conduct rather than belief, and was 
therefore not automatically invalid. 435 u.s., at 626-627 
(opinion of the CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by POWELL, REHNQUIST, and 
STEVENS, JJ.). Nevertheless, the statute was invalid because (1) 
fr conditioned the exercise of a generally available right on the 
rurrender of the right to be a minister, id. at 626, and (2) it 
was not furthered by a substantial state interest. Id. at 628-
629 (state's interest in protecting freedom of religion by 
r:reventing dominance of legislature by clergy was not supported 
by the record) . Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, 
concurred in the judgment, reasoning that the restriction 
burdened the ministers' beliefs as well as their conduct, and was 
fuerefore automatically invalid. Id., at 633 (relying on 
Slerbert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398 (1963)). 
I think either rationale supports the conclusion that the 
state cannot give benefits to handicapped persons generally but 
--------------- ------- - -
deny such benefits to persons pursuing religious careers. The 
state's policy burdens petr's choice of careers in precisely the 
I 
•' I 
same way a tax on ministers would: if petr choose:~ any secular 
11 
career, the state will offer training and education, but if petr 
rnooses a religious career he must pay for it himself. 
Presumably the state could not tax ministers more severely than 
~wyers, doctors, and engineers, because such a tax would impose 
a burden based on a religious classification. The denial of 
generally available privileges based on such classifications is 
m more permissible. Sherbert v. Verner, suPra; Thomas v. Review 
!bard, 450 u.s. 707 (1981). Moreover, to the extent that the 
state's interest is relevant under the plurality opinion in 
~Daniel v. Paty, the only interest advanced in this case is the 
same one advanced by the school board in Bender: the state fears 
that provision of benefits would violate the Establishment 
Clause. That interest disappears if the Court holds that the 
Establishment Clause is not violated here. 
The question is made somewhat more difficult by the fact 
that the aid in this case will directly further a religious 
rursui t. That was not the case in either Sherbert or Thomas, 
both of which involved provision of unemployment benefits to 
persons who could not perform certain jobs for religious reasons. 
I think the appropriate response to that difficulty is that tre 
&ate's provision of benefits to all career choices except 
religious ones is economically no different from a tax on those 
who pursue religious careers. If the tax would be impermissible, 








1. The provision of educational assistance to petr does 
not violate the federal Establishment Clause. The purpose of the 
oosistance program is concededly secular. The program's primary 
effect, viewed as a whole, is to assist the training of 
handicapped persons without regard to their career choice, and 
not to aid religion. It is conceivable that the state program, 
~ administered, could entangle the state in the personal 
religious decisions of beneficiaries (and thereby risk placing 
fue state's imprimatur on religion), but there is nothing in this 
record to support such a finding. 
2. The Court should not address the Free Exercise issue, 
on the ground that the Washington Supreme Court has not held that 
providing petr aid would violate the state constitution. 
3. If the Court does address the Free Exercise issue, it 
ffiould hold that provision of benefits to all save those who 
pursue religious careers violates the Free Exercise Clause, at 
least where the only state interest in the classification is 
avoiding establishment of religion. 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
~TE: November 6, 1985 
' ' ' 'I II 
IE: Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the 
Blind, No. 84-1070 
Argued November 6, 1985 
Cert to Washington Supreme Court 
~,a~~~~~~ 
~~;_~~~~~4 
s#-k- $'/Lr - )£-~  .s)....4...~ 
At oral argument, petr stated that, under Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 u.s. 263 (1981), the Court should and must 
decide the Free Exercise issue in this case. 
Widmar presents a very different situation from ------- -
this case. In Widmar, the Board of Curators of the 
u·liversi ty of Missouri adopted a formal regulation which 
stated: "No University buildings or grounds ... may be 
used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups ••.. The 
general prohibition against use of University buildings 
and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching is 







Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is 
rot open to any other construction." 454 u.s., at 266-267 
n. 3 (quoting regulation). This regulation was then 
~plied to a religious group seeking access to university 
facilities. 
Here, by contrast, there was no written policy of 
any kind when petr applied for aid. In response to petr's 
~plication, the Dep 't of 
policy statement that 
Services for 
says: "The 
the Blind made a 
Washington State 
mnstitution forbids the use of public funds to assist an 
individual in the pursuit of a career or degree in 
theology or related areas." Joint App 4. This policy 
statement concerned the vocational services program 
generally. That program, in turn, is governed by a state 
statute. Rev. Code of wash. 74.16. And the washington 
atpreme Court's decision in this case assumed that that 
state statute authorized payment of benefits to petr. 
Thus, in Widmar the Court faced a state-law 
<Etermination that religious groups could not use 
University facilities. Here, it isn't at all clear what 
state law requires or permits. On the one hand, the state 
Supreme Court assumed that the statute authorizes benefits 
(and the dissenters didn't take issue with that 
3. 
:! 
assumption). On the other hand, the Department-- while 
ooministering the statute assumes that the state 
Constitution forbids payment of benefits to petr. The 
state Supreme Court did not decide the state 
Constitutional issue, although it hinted at the 
a:mclus ion. The two dissenting justices explicitly 
roncluded that the state constitution would not bar aid to 
petr. App to Petn for Cert B-25 to B-42. Under these 
circumstances, 1 think the Court should conclude (1) that 
the Free Exercise issue rests on an antecedent state law 
issue, and (2) that the state law issue is a matter of 
some doubt and hasn't been finally decided. That 
conclusion strongly counsels against addressing the Free 
EXercise issue. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los 








TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: November 7, 1985 
RE: Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the 
Blind, No. 84-1070 
(Argued November 6, 1985) 
Entanglement issue 
In its oral argument, respondent relied very 
heavily on the argument that the aid program in question 
impermissibly entangles government and religion. My bench 
memo argued that this argument was mistaken, because there 
is nothing in the record in this case to supper t it. I 
hold to that conclusion. On further consideration, 
however, )' ·-e changed my recommendation as to the proper 
course of action. I now think the Court should simply 
-----------~ 
decline to address the issue on this record, without any 
,______ ----- ---------·- ------- '-.. 
discussion of whether the federal regulations on their 
face constitute excessive entanglement. 
Respondent's entanglement argument rests completely 
on the Rehabilitation Act and accompanying federal 
L.. 
regulations. The Act requires the state and each 
~dividual beneficiary to prepare an "individualized 
written rehabilitation program." 29 u.s.c. §721 (a) (9); 
id. §722(a). This program should include (1) a statement 
of long-term goals, ( 2) a statement of the particular 
services needed to fulfill those goals, (3) a timetable 
fur progress toward the goals, and (4) "objective criteria 
and an evaluation procedure and schedule for determining 
mether such objectives and goals are being achieved." 
~. §722(b). The accompanying federal regulations require 
that the state conduct a diagnostic study to determine the 
individual's "patterns of work behavior, ability to 
acquire occupational skill and capacity for successful job 
performance." 34 CFR 361.33(b). 
There are three reasons why this argument should 
not succeed. First, as resp conceded at oral argument, 
i 
there 
these federal laws applies to the state's program. 
is nothing in the that record shows that any of 
The 
Rehabilitation Act sections on which resp relies set up 
~~ .. 
cond1t1ons for federal funding. There is nothing in the 
II 
record to show that Washington's program receives federal 
funding under the Rehabilitation Act. 
. . . 
.... . ~ 
Second, entanglement analysis has . been applied to 
government interference with the administration of 
religious institutions. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 
602, 615 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664 
(1969). Indeed, the test the Court created in Lemon looks 
\' 
solely to i (nterference with institutions: "In order to 
determine whether the government entanglement with 
religion is excessive, we must examine the character and 
PJrposes of the institutions that are benefited, the 
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the 
resulting relationship between¢ the governemnt and the 
religious authority." 403 u.s. , at 615. Thus, when the 
government interferes with individuals' freedom to make 
religious choices, as through aid programs like this one, 
the Establishment Clause inquiry should be limited to the 
programs' primary effect. I concede that I have found no 
direct holding to this effect, because the Court has never 
had to decide how far entanglement analysis goes. 
Third, assuming the Act and regs apply here, they -
do not on their face require the state to interfere in 
---------------~------~--~~ 
private religious choices. The state could, consistent 
with the Act, simply check to see (1) that each 







that the beneficiary is maintaining acceptable academic 
standing. That kind of 
criteria, seems innocuous. 
~
monitoring, using secular 
The question, then, is how to address the issue. 
The first two of the three reasons listed above counsel 
strongly in favor of not addressing the issue at all, but 
simply remanding for further development of the question. 
Entanglement was not raised before any court other than -
this one, and it was not decided below. The entanglement 
claim here rests on a federal statute, but respondent 
crlmi ts that there is nothing in the record to show that 
that statute even applies to this program. Finally, there 
is a respectable argument (with which I agree) that 
entanglement analysis is completely inapplicable in a 
cases involving interference in individual decision-
.r 7 
making. That issue would be implici t~solved if the --
Court addressed the entanglement issue here. For these 
reasons, 1 now recommend that the Court decline to address 
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lcf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 u.s. 825, 832 (1973): 
"The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a 
special economic benefit. Whether that benefit be viewed 
as a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive to parents to 
send their children to sectarian schools, or as a reward 
for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is 
to preserve and support religion-oriented institutions." 
2contrary to the Court's implication, see ante, at 7, 
this conclusion does not depend on the fact that 
respondent appears to be the only handicapped student who 
has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious 




in Mueller--something in excess of 90%--flowed ultimately 
to religious institutions. Compare Mueller, supra, at 
401, with id., at 405 (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting) . 
Nevertheless, the aid wa:_p channeled by individual 
parents and not by the state, making the tax deduction 
permissible under the "primary effect" prong of Lemon. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1070 
LARRY WITTERS, PETITIONER v. WASHINGTON 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WASHINGTON 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the First 
Amendment precludes the State of Washington from extend-
ing assistance under a state vocational rehabilitation assist-
ance program to a blind person studying at a Christian col-
lege and seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth 
director. Finding no such federal constitutional barrier on 
the record presented to us, we reverse and remand. 
I 
Petitioner Larry Witters applied in 1979 to the Washington 
Commission for the Blind for vocational rehabilitation serv-
ices pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 74.16.181. 1 That stat-
ute authorized the Commission, inter alia, to "[p]rovide for 
special education and/or training in the professions, business 
or trades" so as to "assist visually handicapped persons to 
overcome vocational handicaps and to obtain the maximum 
degree of self-support and self-care." Ibid. Petitioner, suf-
fering from a progressive eye condition, was eligible for voca-
' In 1983 the Washington legislature repealed chapters 74.16 and 74.17 
of the Code, enacting in their place a new chapter 74.18. The statutory 
revision abolished the Commission for the Blind and created respondent 
Department of Services for the Blind. See 1983 Wash. Laws, chapter 194, 
§ 3. We shall refer to respondent for purposes of this opinion as "the 
Commission." 
84-107~PINION 
2 WITTERS v. WASH. DEPT. OF SERVICES FOR BLIND 
tional rehabilitation assistance under the terms of the stat-
ute. 2 He was at the time attending Inland Empire School of 
the Bible, a private Christian college in Spokane, Washing-
ton, and studying bible, ethics, speech, and church adminis-
tration in order to equip himself for a career as a pastor, mis-
sionary, or youth director. J. A. 7-8. 
The Commission denied petitioner aid. It relied on an ear-
lier determination embodied in a Commission policy state-
ment that "[t]he Washington State constitution forbids the 
use of public funds to assist an individual in the pursuit of a 
career or degree in theology or related areas," J. A. 4, and on 
its conclusion that petitioner's training was "religious instruc-
tion" subject to that ban. J. A. 1. That ruling was affirmed 
by a state hearing examiner, who held that the Commission 
was precluded from funding petitioner's training "in light of 
the State Constitution's prohibition against the state directly 
or indirectly supporting a religion." Pet. App. F -6. The 
hearing examiner cited Wash. Const, art. I,§ 11, providing in 
part that "no public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruc-
tion, or the support of any religious establishment," and 
Wash. Const, art. IX, § 4, providing that "[a]ll schools main-
tained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall 
be forever free from sectarian control or influence." I d., at 
F -4. That ruling, in turn, was upheld on internal adminis-
trative appeal. 
Petitioner then instituted an action in state superior court 
for review of the administrative decision; the court affirmed 
2 Wash. Rev. Code chapter 74.18, see supra, n. 1, establishes a require-
ment that aid recipients be persons who "(1) have no vision or limited vi-
sion which constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment 
and (2) can reasonably be expected to benefit from vocational rehabilitation 
services in terms of employability." Wash. Rev. Code § 74.18.130 (Supp. 
1986) (effective June 30, 1983). It has not been established whether peti-
tioner is eligible for aid under the new standard. That determination, 
however, will have no effect on any claim asserted by petitioner for re-
imbursement of aid withheld beginning in 1979. 
84-1070-0PINION 
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on the same state-law grounds cited by the agency. The 
state supreme court affirmed as well. The supreme court, 
however, declined to ground its ruling on the Washington 
constitution. Instead, it explicitly reserved judgment on the 
state constitutional issue and chose to base its ruling on the 
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. The 
court stated: 
"The Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test for 
determining the constitutionality of state aid under the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. 'First, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the 
statute must not foster "an excessive government entan-
glement with religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, [403 
U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971)]. To withstand attack under 
the establishment clause, the challenged state action 
must satisfy each of the three criteria." Witters v. State 
Commission for the Blind, 689 P. 2d 53, 55 (Wash. 
1984). 
The Washington court had no difficulty finding the "secular 
purpose" prong of that test satisfied. Applying the second 
prong, however, that of "principal or primary effect," the 
court held that "[t]he provision of financial assistance by the 
state to enable someone to become a pastor, missionary or 
church youth director clearly has the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion." ld., at 56. The court, therefore, held 
that provision of aid to petitioner would contravene the Fed-
eral Constitution. In light of that ruling, the court saw no 
need to reach the "entanglement" prong; it stated that the 
record was in any case inadequate for such an inquiry. 
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II 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has 
consistently presented this Court with difficult questions of 
interpretation and application. We acknowledged in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, that "we can only dimly perceive the 
lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of 
constitutional law." Lemon, supra, at 612, quoted in 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 393 (1983). Nonetheless, 
the Court's opinions in this area have at least clarified "the 
broad contours of our inquiry," Committee for Public Educa-
tion v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 761 (1973), and are sufficient 
to dispose of this case. 
We are guided, as was the court below, by the three-part 
test set out by this Court in Lemon and quoted supra 
p. --. See Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, --
U. S. --, -- (1985). Our analysis relating to the first 
prong of that test is simple: all parties concede the unmistak-
ably secular purpose of the Washington program. That pro-
gram was designed to promote the well-being of the visually 
handicapped through the provision of vocational rehabilita-
tion services, and no more than a minuscule amount of the aid 
awarded under the program is likely to flow to religious edu-
cation. No party suggests that the State's "actual purpose" 
in creating the program was to endorse religion, Wallace v. 
Jaffree, --U.S.--,-- (1985), quoting Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U. S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), 
or that the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is 
merely "sham." Wallace, supra, at -- (POWELL, J., 
concurring). 
The answer to the question posed by the second prong of 
the Lemon test is more difficult. We conclude, however, 
that extension of aid to petitioner is not barred on that 
ground either. 3 It is well-settled that the Establishment 
8 Respondent offers extensive argument before this Court relating to 
the practical workings of the state vocational assistance program. Focus-
ing on the asserted practical "nature and operation of that program," Brief 
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Clause is not violated every time money previously in the 
possession of a State is conveyed to a religious institution. 
For example, a State may issue a paycheck to one of its em-
ployees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to 
a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and 
the State may do so even knowing that the employee so in-
tends to dispose of his salary. It is equally well-settled, on 
the other hand, that the State may not grant aid to a religious 
school, whether cash or in-kind, where the effect of the aid is 
"that of a direct subsidy to the religious school" from the 
State. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, supra, at 
Aid may have that effect even though it takes the 
form of aid to students or parents. Id., at--; see, e. g., 
Wolman v. Walker, 433 U. S. 229, 248-251 (1977); Commit-
tee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra; Sloan v. Lemon, 
413 U. S. 825 (1973). The question presented is whether, on 
the facts as they appear in the record before us, extension of 
aid to petitioner and the use of that aid by petitioner to sup-
port his religious education is a permissible transfer similar 
for Respondent at 6, respondent asserts that the nature of the program in 
fact leads to an impermissible "symbolic union" of governmental and reli-
gious functions, "requir[ing] government choices at every stage of the re-
habilitation process" and "intertwining ... governmental decisionmaking 
.. . with decisionmaking by church and school authorities." Id., at 20. 
Respondent contends that the program therefore violates the second and 
third prongs of the Lemon test in a way that "hands off" aid, such as that 
provided pursuant to the GI Bill, does not. Id., at 11. 
This argument, however, was not presented to the state courts, and ap-
pears to rest in large part on facts not part of the record before us. Be-
cause this Court must affirm or reverse upon the case as it appears in the 
record, Russell v. Southard, 53 U. S. (12 How.) 139, 159 (1851); see also 
New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U. S. 392, 450, n. 66 (1970), we have no 
occasion to consider the argument here. Nor is it appropriate, as a matter 
of good judicial administration, for us to consider claims that have not been 
the subject of factual development in earlier proceedings. On remand, it 
will be up to the Washington Supreme Court as a matter of state proce-
dural law whether and to what extent it should reopen the record for the 
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to the hypothetical salary donation described above, or is an 
impermissible "direct subsidy." 
Certain aspects of Washington's program are central to our 
inquiry. As far as the record shows, vocational assistance 
provided under the Washington program is paid directly to 
the student, who transmits it to the educational institution of 
his or her choice. Any aid provided under Washington's pro-
gram that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so 
only as a result of the genuinely independent and private 
choices of aid recipients. 4 Washington's program is "made 
available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsec-
tarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution bene-
fited," Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 
782-783, n. 38, and is in no way skewed towards religion. It 
is not one of "the ingenious plans for channeling state aid to 
sectarian schools that periodically reach this Court," id., at 
785. It creates no financial incentive for students to under-
take sectarian education, see id., at 785-786. It does not 
tend to provide greater or broader benefits for recipients 
who apply their aid to religious education, nor are the full 
benefits of the program limited, in large part or in whole, to 
students at sectarian institutions. On the contrary, aid re-
cipients have full opportunity to expend vocational rehabilita-
tion aid on wholly secular education, and as a practical matter 
have rather greater prospects to do so. Aid recipients' 
choices are made among a huge variety of possible careers, of 
which only a small handful are sectarian. In this case, the 
fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to 
support religious education is made by the individual, not by 
the State. 
• This is not the case described in Grand Rapids, supra, at -
("Where ... no meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the stu-
dent and aid to the school, 'the concept of a loan to individuals is a transpar-
ent fiction.') , quoting Wolman, supra, at 264 (opinion of POWELL, J.); see 
also Wolman, supra, at 250. 
84-1070-0PINION 
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Further, and importantly, nothing in the record indicates 
that, if petitioner succeeds, any significant portion of the aid 
expended under the Washington program as a whole will end 
up flowing to religious education. The function of the Wash-
ington program is hardly "to provide desired financial sup-
port for nonpublic, sectarian institutions." I d., at 783; see 
Sloan v. Lemon, supra; cf. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 
363-364 (1975). The program, providing vocational assist-
ance to the visually handicapped, does not seem well-suited 
to serve as the vehicle for such a subsidy. No evidence has 
been presented indicating that any other person has ever 
sought to finance religious education or activity pursuant to 
the State's program. The combination of these factors, we 
think, makes the link between the State and the school peti-
tioner wishes to attend a highly attenuated one. 
On the facts we have set out, it does not seem appropriate 
to view any aid ultimately flowing to the Inland Empire 
School of the Bible as resulting from a state action sponsoring 
or subsidizing religion. Nor does the mere circumstance 
that petitioner has chosen to use neutrally available state aid 
to help pay for his religious education confer any message of 
state endorsement of religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U. S., at 688 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Thus, while amici 
supporting respondent are correct in pointing out that aid to 
a religious institution unrestricted in its potential uses, if 
properly attributable to the State, is "clearly prohibited · 
under the Establishment Clause," Grand Rapids, supra, at 
--, because it may subsidize the religious functions of that 
institution, that observation is not apposite to this case. On 
the facts present here, we think the Washington program 
works no state support of religion prohibited by the Estab-
lishment Clause. 5 
5 We decline to address the "entanglement" issue at this time. As a 
prudential matter, it would be inappropriate for us to address that question 
without the benefit of a decision on the issue below. Further, we have no 
84-1070--0PINION 
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We therefore reject the claim that, on the record pre-
sented, extension of aid under Washington's vocational re-
habilitation program to finance petitioner's training at a 
Christian college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth di-
rector would advance religion in a manner inconsistent with 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. On re-
mand, the state court is of course free to consider the applica-
bility of the "far stricter" dictates of the Washington state 
constitution, see Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, 
689 P. 2d, at 55. It may also choose to reopen the factual 
record in order to consider the arguments made by respond-
ent and discussed supra, nn. 3 & 5. We decline petitioner's 
invitation to leapfrog consideration of those issues by holding 
that the Free Exercise Clause requires Washington to extend 
vocational rehabilitation aid to petitioner regardless of what 
the state constitution commands or further factual develop-
ment reveals, and we express no opinion on that matter. 
See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568 
(1947). 
The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
reason to doubt the conclusion of the Washington Supreme Court that that 
analysis could be more fruitfully conducted on a more complete record. 
Justice Powell 
Bill 
DATE: December 27, 1985 
RE: Witters v. Washington Dep 't of Services for the 
Blind, No. 84-1070 
Justice Marshall's draft Opinion for the Court 
This is the case in which washington denied 
educational aid to a blind student who wished to study for 
the ministry. The washington Supreme Court found that the 
Establishment Clause forbade provision of aid to Witters, 
on the ground that the "primary effect" of any such aid 
would be to advance religion. This Court voted 9-0 to 
reverse; Justice Marshall's draft opinion has now 
circulated. 
The opinion suggests that the aid is permissible 
for two reasons: (i) "[a]ny aid •.. that ultimately flows 
to religious institutions does so only as a result of the 
genuinely independent and private choices of aid 
recipients," (p. 6) and (ii) the great majority of the aid 
provided under the relevant program goes to fund secular 
. ' 
, .. 
education. See pp. 6-7. The opinion relies on a number 
of cases, but by far the most heavily cited is your 
opinion for the Court in Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 u.S. 756 (1973) . In Nyquist, the Court 
invalidated a program of tuition grants to private school 
benefitted private and public school students alike might 
--~~~~ --
be c~stitut~issible. See 413 u.s., at 783 n. 
38 (mentioning the G. I. Bill as an example) • Justice 
Marshall's Witters draft notes that, unlike the scheme 
invalidated in Nyquist, washington's aid program "creates 
no financial incentive" for recipients to pursue religious 
training. (p. 6) That, combined with the small amount of 
·aid actually going to religious institutions, means that 
washington's program does not have the primary effect of 
advancing religion. 
I have no real quarrel with any of these 
statements, but I do think Justice Marshall's draft has 
two significant problems. These problems result primarily -
from what isn't discussed, and I'm afraid they may send 
some false signals to lawyers (who read the Court's 
Establishment Clause cases with especially close 




1. Justice Marshall completely ignores Mueller v. 
< ' 
463 u.s. 388 (1983). In Mueller, the Court 





despite the fact that 95% of those taking the 
wer~s ff children attending religious 
The Court found the deduction valid for two 
~ -
~' any benefit to religion was the result of 
the private choices of individual taxpayers--unlike, say, 
a state program that directly subsidized religious 
institutions. 463 u.s., at 399. ~ the Court 
emphasized that the deduction was available to parents of 
public school children as well as those in private ------schools. ~., at 397. It was therefore neutral in a way 
that the Nyquist tuition-gra~t program was not. 
To my mind, Mueller makes this case incredibly 
easy. As in Mueller, the aid here is offered to all 
handicapped students regardless of whether they plan to 
attend public or private institutions. Also as in 
Mueller, the aid goes directly to the students and not to 
lft>/'J 
the institutions. That resolves this case. ~ paragraph 
A 
at the top of page 7, which suggests that the absence of a 
large number of handicapped students wishing to pursue ..._________ 
religious studies t is 
' ~ 
/'1n--
unnecessary and sends a false clue. Under Mueller, even 
.....____,...__ ---------
if a majority of the beneficiaries of the state's aid used 
it to study religion, the state's program would be 
permissible because any aid to religion is the result of 
the st~dents' private choices. 
The absence of any citations to Mueller (except for 
a trivial cite at the top of page 4), combined with the 
presence of the paragraph at the top of p. 7, suggests 
that the Court is backing away from its decision. in that 
case. I think that unnecessarily breeds uncertainty in -this area, by seeming to reopen issues that Mueller 
appeared to close. 
2. Both petr and the SG argued at length that the 
washington Supreme Court's critical error in this case was 
to gauge the "primary effect" of the aid program by 
reference to this particular case, as opposed to looking 
at the program's overall effect. Nowhere does Justice 
.Marshall's opinion squarely address this issue, which 1 
thought was at the heart of the case. This may not be 
worth raising in a letter--and I don't think it alone 
would justify a concurrance--but if you wish to write 
separately for other reasons, I think it would be useful 
to emphasize that the relevant "effect 11 is assessed by 
reference to the universe of beneficiaries, not by 
reference to the individual litigants. (Otherwise, no 
neutral aid program would stand under the Establishment 
Clause, since the effect of the program would be to aid 
religion whenever the individual beneficiary chose to use 
his or her benefits for a religious purpose.) 
In light of these points, I think you should 
perhaps join the opinion, but write a separate (brief) 
concurrance emphasizing (i) that the program's overall 
jJ.~Y { effect is what counts, and (ii) that under Mueller, the 
a)- 1' M effect of washington • s program is indisputably 
~~tf 
~t~ permissible. Alternatively, you might wish to raise these 
~ ) :~:::r~;s i:p;n:::~er to Justice Marshall to see if he will 
~ If you wind up writing separately, you may also ~ ~l~ . wish to add some comments on the "entanglement" issue, 
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sufficient record. (pp. 7-8 note 5) In my bench memo, I 
suggested that entanglement analysis did not logically 
apply in a case, like this one, in which the state aid was 
going to an individual and not a religious institution. 
' I 
I· ! 
The parties do not argue the point, but it might be a good 
one to make in a short concurrance, in order to avoid any 
implication that, were the record more fully developed, an 
entanglement problem might be presented here. I'll be 
happy to write more on this last point if you wish. 
December 31, 1985 
84-1070 Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services 
Dear Thurgood: 
I think you have written a fine opinion, and I ex-
pect to be able to join you. 
I do have two suggestions for your consideration. 
I agree that Nyquist - upon which you rely heavily - is rel-
evant and persuasive authority. I believe, however, that 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 u.s. 388 (1983) is even stronger au-
thority for the results you reach. In Mueller, we sustained 
a tax deduction for certain kinds of educational expenses 
despite the fact that about 95t of those benefited were par-
ents of children attending religious schools. The Mueller 
Court approved the deduction because any benefit to religion 
was the result of the private choice of individual taxpayers 
{id., at 399), and also because the deduction was equally 
available to parents of public school children and parents 
of children attending private schools (id., at 397). The 
aid to religion in this case results from Witters' personal 
choice, and aid is offered to all handicapped persons re-
gardless of the type of school they attend. Mueller there-
fore is a highly relevant if not controlling authority. 
Secondly, both petitioner and the SG arqued that 
the Washington Supreme Court erred in gauging the "primary 
effect" of the aid program by reference to this particular 
case rather than looking to the program's overall effect. 
Would it not be helpful to make clear that the relevant "ef-
fect" of an aid program is to be determined in light of its 
overall purpose and effect, rather than by how the program 
may impact upon one individual? 
In sum, although your well written opinion supports 
reversal, I do think it would be stronger i. f additions along 
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January 3, 1986 
Re: 84-1070 - Witters v. Washington Dept. 
of Services for the Blind 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.iu.vrtntt Qfttud ttf tqt ~tb ,ihdts 
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January 3, 1986 
84-1070 Witters v. Washington Department of Services 
Dear Lewis: vt 
Thank you for your thoughtful comments. V/ 
/~ ,-1?· 
I continue to believe that the Mueller case was wrongly 
decided, and am concerned that extensive discussion of it would 
only muddy the waters here. Because it is crystal clear in this 
case that the state aid is as much available to students 
attending secular schools as it is to those attending sectarian 
ones, there is no need to revisit the questions that so deeply 
divided the Court in Mueller, such as whether the tax deduction 
really was equally available for secular and sectarian purposes, 
or as to whether the benefit to religion really was attributable 
wholly to private choices. This easy case can be decided on 
narrower, less controversial grounds, and I believe that it 
should be. Further, the fact that the challenged aid was part of 
a comprehensive state tax deduction plan was a key factor relied 
upon by the Mueller Court, and is not present here. 
I am also concerned that a sweeping statement that the 
effect of an aid program, for purposes of the Lemon test, is to 
be determined with reference to the program's "overall" effect 
rather than its individual applications, may not be consistent 
with our case law. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1971), 
we invalidated a provision of federal law - under which the federal 
government provided construction grants for college and 
university buildings even though those buildings might, after the 
passage of twenty years, be used for sectarian purposes. We ~~f~ 
reached that result even though it might have been said that
relatively few buildings financed un er ne program would in fact~ 7 
be used for religious purposes, and therefore the "overall" . 
effect of the program would be secular. In Hunt v. McNair, 413 
U.S. 734 (1973), again considering governmental aid to 
institutions of higher education, we explicitly "narrow[ed] our 
focus from the statute as a whole to the only transaction 
presently before us." Id., at 742. We suggested that a general 
program of state aid to colleges and universities would be 
unconstitutional to the extent it provided aid to even one 7 
pervasively sectarian institution. Id., at 743-744. We 
expressed similar views in Roemer v.:Maryland Public Works Board, 
426 U.S. 736 (1976), in which more than two thirds of the 
institutions aided under the state program were secular. While 
it may be possible to fashion a rule consistent both with these 9f ~ 
(and other) cases and witb the~gument, such an excursion 
is ~ to decision of this case, and I think probably 
is best avoided. 
I hope my concern that we produce as narrow an opinion as 
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84-1070 \.Jitters v. Wash inqton Department 
Dear Thurgood, 
I appreciate your prompt response. Mueller v. Allen, 
of course, is a Court decision. Unless overruleo it is a 
-precedent that all lO\>Jer federal courts are ohliged to fol-
low. Omitting mention of Mueller sends a some\'lhat confusing 
signal to lower courte, since it suqqests--quite wrongly, in 
my view--that Mne11er is inaoplicahle to cases like this 
one. 
Nor do I think that Tilton v. Richar son, 403 U.S. 
672 (1971) anrl rrunt v. McNair, 413 u.~. 734 (1973) impliedly 
require us to assess the "primary effect" of ashington's 
ajd orogram by referenc~ to petitioner alone. Both Tilton 
and Hunt involv_d direct state airl to re1tqious instjtu-
ti.ons--a part i.cnl rly susPect form of government assistance 
to religion, as our decic;ions last erm show. See Grand 
P.aoid~ School District v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3~28-3?.29 
(1985) 1 Aquilar v. Felton, J05 S.Ct. 3232, 3241 (1985) (POW-
ELL, J., concurring). Aid that is given to individuals who 
may or mav not choose to use it for religious purposes 
raises lesser concerns. Mueller v. AJlen is aqain instruc-
tive. The Court in that case did not asses~ the "primary 
effect" of Minnesota's tax deduction in terms of the parents 
who were parties to the case1 rather, we emphasized the pro-
gram's broad sweep, its neutrality, and the fact that any 
aid to religion depended on the private choicPs of the in0j-
vidua1 beneficiaries. 463 u.s., at 397-400. The aid in 
this case is far closer in principle to the tax de~uction at 
issue in Mueller than to the direct ai~ to rel'qious col-
leges involved in Hunt and Tilton. 
I will cPrtainly 1oin the iudqment in this case, but 
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84-1070 
WITTERS v. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and in the judgment. 
~t~~ 
As the Court explai~, ' the central question in this 
case is whether Washington's provision of aid to 
handicapped students has the "primary effect" of advancing 
religion. Mueller v. Allen, supra, makes the answer 
<M~~~~~ 
clear: state programs that ne.JJtraJ l}l.. nf~er educational 
I\ 
assistance to a class of citizens defined without 
, . . , 
2. 
reference to religionl do not violate the second prong of 
the Lemon v. Kurtzman test1 because any aid to religion 
results from the private choices of individual 
beneficiaries. Thus, in Mueller, we sustained a tax 
deduction for certain kinds of educational expenses, 
despite the fact that the great majority of those who 
d._ O would benefi \ th~uil.by were parents of children attending 
sectarian schools. See id., at 401. We noted the state's 
traditionally broad taxing authority, id., at 396, but the 
decision rested principally on two other facts. First, 
the deduction was equally available to parents of public 
school children and parents of children attending private 
schools. !d., at 397. Cf. Committee for Public Education 
v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 782-783 n. 38 (1973). Second, 
any benefit to religion resulted from the "numerous, 
'•f" 
3. 
private choices of individual parents of school-age 
children." Mueller, supra, at 399. 
The state program at issue in this case provides 
aid to handicapped students as long as their studies are 
likely to lead to some kind of productive employment. Aid 
does not depend on whether the student wishes to attend a 
public university or a private college, nor does it turn 
on whether the student seeks training for a religious or 
secular career. It 
state's program does 
advancing religion.2 
follows ~ 
not have the 




The Washington Supreme Court reached a different 
conclusion because it found that the program's 
constitutionality depended on the primary effect of giving 




v. State Commission for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 56 (Wash. 
1984). In effect, the court analyzed the case as if the 
aid were the result of a private bill passed by the 
washington legislature, awarding free tuition to 
respondent in order to permit him to pursue religious 
studies. Because the aid program would ease respondent's 
~f..J:i:. 
path to religious service, the court found that its effect 
1\ 
was primarily to advance religion. 
Such an analysis squarely conflicts with Mueller. 
Nowhere does the Court's opinion in that case analyze the 
t-~~ 
.~ • . . .f effect of Minnesota's tax deduction on the parents who 
r~ ~ were parties to the case; rather, we looked to the nature 
«~ pV 
~~nd consequences of the program viewed as a whole. 
~~ ~ueller, supra, at 397-400. ~ ~i~.s~e 
~rrr ~ "'""4 ~*" ~ ~ , 
' 1 r Vv' he..t:..e.rf 1'" r~td "fe washington program easily satisfies the 
~~~).~~~~ 
tfV1l:L~ . ~ Jp{'" ~ 
~- ~}0  ~ • . 
~ trrV J ~ &~ 
5. 
second prong of the Lemon test. Because I agree, for the 
reasons stated by the Court, that the program has a 
secular purpose, and that no entanglement challenge is 
properly raised on this record, I join the Court's 
judgment. On the understanding that nothing we do today 
undercuts the authority of our decision in Mueller, I join 
the Court's opinion as well. 
~- ~ ~ LdZ..v -k Tftt ~ 
~~1~~~w-e~ 
t/~ ~~- ~~ r/11~ 
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January 9, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1070 Witters v. Washington Department of 
Services for the Blind 
Dear Thurgood, 
My sentiments about our case law in this area are much 
like those which Byron has expressed in his short 
concurrence. Nonetheless, I could join an opinion which 
evenhandedly discussed the applicable cases in support of 
the result for which all of us ~d at Conference. But I 
agree with Lewis that your opinion, particularly in its 
failure to even mention Mueller v. Allen, is not such an 
evenhanded discussion of the cases, and I gather from your 
response to him that you intend to make no changes along the 
line he suggested. I will therefore a~t ~hat Le~ s 
writes, and either join that or join Byron's concurrence. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
iluprtutt Oflt1U1 Df tltt ~tb iltatt• 
._uqinghm. ~· <IJ. 2ll~~~ 
January 9, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1070 Witters v. Washington Department of 
Services for the Blind 
Dear Thurgood, 
My sentiments about our case law in this area are much 
like those which Byron has expressed in his short 
concurrence. Nonetheless, I could join an opinion which 
evenhandedly discussed the applicable cases in support of 
the result f~ hich all of us voted at Conference. But I 
agree with Lewi that your opinion, particularly in its 
failure to even mention Mueller v. Allen, is not such an 
evenhanded · ussion of the cases, and I gather from your 
response to him that you intend to make no changes along the 
line he suggested. I will therefore await what Lewis 
writes, and either join that or join Byro~concurrence. 
Justice Marshall 






JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,jltlfrtntt Qf01trlltf l4t 'J'nittlt jtatt,e-
'Jiultiqt.on, J. elf. 2llt?~~ 
January 10, 1986 
No. 84-1070 Witters v. Washington Dept. of 
Services for the Blind 
Dear Thurgood, 
I agree with most of your opinion in this 
case but I also think Lewis is correct in suggesting 
that Mueller lends support to the concept that "a 
program ... that neutrally provides state assistance 
to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject 
to challenge under the Establishment Clause." 
463 u.s. 388, 398-399. Accordingly, for now I will 
wait for the additional writing. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1070 
LARRY WITTERS, PETITIONER v. WASHINGTON 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WASHINGTON 
[January -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The Court's omis~ion of Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 
(1983), from its analysis may mislead courts and litigants by 
suggesting that Mueller is somehow inapplicable to cases 
such as this one. 1 I write separately to emphasize that 
Mueller strongly supports the result we reach today. 
As the Court states, the central question in this case is 
whether Washington's provision of aid to handicapped stu-
dents has the "principal or primary effect" of advancing reli-
gion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). See 
also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 783-785 n. 39 (1973). Mueller makes the answer clear: 
state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational 
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do 
not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, 2 
because any aid to religion results from the private choices of 
'The Court offers no explanation for omitting Mueller from its substan-
tive discussion. Indeed, save for a single citation on a phrase with no sub-
stantive import whatever, ante, at 4, Mueller is not even mentioned. 
2 Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973): 
"The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic bene-
fit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an in-
centive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a re-
ward for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve 
and support religion-oriented institutions." 
cO -oU> 
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individual beneficiaries. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 398-399. 
Thus, in Mueller, we sustained a tax deduction for certain 
educational expenses, even though the great majority of 
beneficiaries were parents of children attending sectarian 
schools. I d., at 401. We noted the state's traditionally 
broad taxing authority, id., at 396, but the decision rested 
principally on two other factors. First, the deduction was 
equally available to parents of public school children and par-
ents of children attending private schools. I d., at 397; see 
Nyquist, supra, at 782-783 n. 38. Second, any benefit to re-
ligion resulted from the "numerous, private choices of indi-
vidual parents of school-age children." Mueller, supra, at 
399. 
The state program at issue here provides aid to handi-
capped students when their studies are likely to lead to em-
ployment. Aid does not depend on whether the student 
wishes to attend a public university or a private college, nor 
does it turn on whether the student seeks training for a reli-
gious or a secular career. It follows that under Mueller the 
state's program does not have the "principal or primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion. 3 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion because it found that the program had the practical 
effect of aiding religion in this particular case. Witters v. 
State Commission for the Blind, 689 P. 2d 53, 56 (Wash. 
1984). In effect, the court analyzed the case as if the Wash-
ington legislature had passed a private bill that awarded re-
spondent free tuition to pursue religious studies. 
3 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 7, this conclusion does 
not depend on the fact that respondent appears to be the only handicapped 
student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious training. 
Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller ultimately flowed to religious insti-
tutions. Compare Mueller, supra, at 401, with id., at 405 (MARSHALL, J . , 
dissenting). Nevertheless, the aid was thus channeled by individual par-
ents and not by the state, making the tax deduction permissible under the 
"primary effect" test of Lemon. 
84-1070--CONCUR 
WITTERS v. WASH. DEPT. OF SERVICES FOR BLIND 3 
Such an analysis conflicts with both common sense and es-
tablished precedent. 4 Now here in Mueller did we analyze 
the effect of Minnesota's tax deduction on the parents who 
were parties to the case; rather, we looked to the nature and 
consequences of the program viewed as a whole. Mueller, 
supra, at 397-400. The same is true of our evaluation of the 
tuition reimbursement programs at issue in Nyquist, supra, 
at 780-789, and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 830-832 
(1973). See also Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 
243-244, 248 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 17 (1954)._, This is the appropriate perspective for 
this case as wellW \Tiewed in the proper light, the Washing-
ton program easily satisfies the second prong of the Lemon 
test. 
I agree, for the reasons stated by the Court, that the 
State's program has a secular purpose, and that no entangle-
ment challenge is properly raised on this record. I therefore 
join the Court's judgment. On the understanding that noth-
ing we do today lessens the authority of our decision in 
Mueller, I join the Court's opinion as well. 
'Under the Washington Supreme Court's approach, the government 
could never provide aid of any sort to one who would use it for religious 
purposes, no matter what the characteristics of the challenged program. 
This Court has never taken such an approach. Walz v. Tax Commission, 
397 U. S. 664 (1970); see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16 
(1954). 
e perspec 1ve may eren m cases m which the State directly 
aids religious institutions. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 742-743 
(1973); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 755 
(1976) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). The danger that aid will, in effect, 
place the State's imprimatur on a particular religious group is much 
greater in such cases than when "numerous, private choices" of individual 
beneficiaries stand between the State and any benefit to religion. See 
Mueller, supra, at 399. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2497 
(1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (Lemon "requires courts to 
examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether 
the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement"). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The Court's inexplicable omission of Mueller v. Allen, 463 
U. S. 388 (1983), from its analysis may mislead courts and lit-
igants by suggesting that Mueller is somehow inapplicable to 
cases such as this one. 1 I write separately to emphasize that 
Mueller strongly supports the result we reach today. 
As the Court states, the central question in this case is 
whether Washington's provision of aid to handicapped stu-
dents has the "principal or primary effect" of advancing reli-
gion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). See 
also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 783-785 n. 39 (1973). Mueller makes the answer clear: 
state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational 
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do 
not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, 2 
because any aid to religion results from the private choices of 
1 The Court offers no explanation for omitting Mueller from its substan-
tive discussion. Indeed, save for a single citation on a phrase with no sub-
stantive import whatever, ante, at 4, Mueller is not even mentioned. 
' Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973): 
"The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic bene-
fit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an in-
centive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a re-
ward for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve 
and support religion-oriented institutions. " 
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individual beneficiaries. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 398-399. 
Thus, in Mueller, we sustained a tax deduction for certain 
educational expenses, even though the great majority of 
beneficiaries were parents of children attending sectarian 
schools. I d., at 401. We noted the state's traditionally 
broad taxing authority, id., at 396, but the decision rested 
principally on two other factors. First, the deduction was 
equally available to parents of public school children and par-
ents of children attending private schools. I d., at 397; see 
Nyquist, supra, at 782-783 n. 38. Second, any benefit tore-
ligion resulted from the "numerous, private choices of indi-
vidual parents of school-age children." Mueller, supra, at 
399. 
The state program at issue here provides aid to handi-
capped students when their studies are likely to lead to em-
ployment. Aid does not depend on whether the student 
wishes to attend a public university or a private college, nor 
does it turn on whether the student seeks training for a reli-
gious or a secular career. It follows that under Mueller the 
state's program does not have the "principal or primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion. 3 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion because it found that the program had the practical 
effect of aiding religion in this particular case. Witters v. 
State Commission for the Blind, 689 P. 2d 53, 56 (Wash. 
1984). In effect, the court analyzed the case as if the aid 
were the result of a private bill passed by the Washington 
legislature that awarded respondent free tuition to pursue re-
ligious studies. 
3 Contrary to the Court's implication, see ante, at 7, this conclusion does 
not depend on the fact that respondent appears to be the only handicapped 
student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious training. 
Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller flowed ultimately to religious insti-
tutions .. Compare Mueller, supra, at 401, with id., at 405 (MARSHALL, J. , 
dissenting). Nevertheless, the aid was so channeled by individual parents 
and not by the state, making the tax deduction permissible under the "pri-
mary effect" test of Lemon. 
84-1070-CONCUR 
WITTERS v. WASH. DEPT. OF SERVICES FOR BLIND 3 
Such an analysis conflicts with both common sense and es-
tablished precedent. 4 Now here in Mueller did we analyze 
the effect of Minnesota's tax deduction on the parents who 
were parties to the case; rather, we looked to the nature and 
consequences of the program viewed as a whole. Mueller, 
supra, at 397-400. The same is true of our evaluation of the 
tuition reimbursement programs at issue in Nyquist, supra, 
at 780-789, and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 830-832 
(1973). See also Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 
243-244, 248 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 17 (1954). This is the appropriate perspective for 
this case as well. 5 Viewed in the proper light, the Washing-
ton program easily satisfies the second prong of the Lemon 
test. 
I agree, for the reasons stated by the Court, that the 
State's program has a secular purpose, and that no entangle-
ment challenge is properly raised on this record. I therefore 
join the Court's judgment. On the understanding that noth-
ing we do today lessens the authority of our decision in 
Mueller, I join the Court's opinion as well. 
'If the Washington Supreme Court's approach were applied in all cases, 
the government could never provide aid of any sort to one who would use it 
for religious purposes, no matter what the characteristics of the relevant 
program. This Court has never taken such an approach. W alz v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
u. s. 1, 16 (1954). 
5 The perspective may be different in cases in which the State directly 
aids religious institutions. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 742-743 
(1973); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 755 
(1976) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). The danger that aid will, in effect, 
place the State's imprimatur of approval on a particular religious group is 
much greater in such cases than when "numerous, private choices" of indi-
vidual beneficiaries stand between the State and any benefit to religion. 
See Mueller, supra, at 399. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 
2497 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (Lemon "requires 
courts to examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and 
whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement"). 
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No. 84-1070 
LARRY WITTERS, PETITIONER v. WASHINGTON 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WASHINGTON 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The Court's omission of Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 
(1983), from its analysis may mislead courts and litigants by 
suggesting that Mueller is somehow inapplicable to cases 
such as this one. 1 I write separately to emphasize that 
Mueller strongly supports the result we reach today. 
As the Court states, the central question in this case is 
whether Washington's provision of aid to handicapped stu-
dents has the "principal or primary effect" of advancing reli-
gion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). See 
also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 783-785 n. 39 (1973). Mueller makes the answer clear: 
state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational 
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do 
not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, 2 
because any aid to religion results from the private choices of 
1 The Court offers no explanation for omitting Mueller from its substan-
tive discussion. Indeed, save for a single citation on a phrase with no sub-
stantive import whatever, ante, at 4, Mueller is not even mentioned. 
2 Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973): 
"The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic bene-
fit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an in-
centive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a re-
ward for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve 
and support religion-oriented institutions. " 
... 
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individual beneficiaries. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 398-399. 
Thus, in Mueller, we sustained a tax deduction for certain 
educational expenses, even though the great majority of 
beneficiaries were parents of children attending sectarian 
schools. I d., at 401. We noted the state's traditionally 
broad taxing authority, id., at 396, but the decision rested 
principally on two other factors. First, the deduction was 
equally available to parents of public school children and par-
ents of children attending private schools. I d., at 397; see 
Nyquist, supra, at 782-783 n. 38. Second, any benefit tore-
ligion resulted from the "numerous, private choices of indi-
vidual parents of school-age children." Mueller, supra, at 
399. 
The state program at issue here provides aid to handi-
capped students when their studies are likely to lead to em-
ployment. Aid does not depend on whether the student 
wishes to attend a public university or a private college, nor 
does it turn on whether the student seeks training for a reli-
gious or a secular career. It follows that under Mueller the 
state's program does not have the "principal or primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion. 3 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion because it found that the program had the practical 
effect of aiding religion in this particular case. Witters v. 
State Commission for the Blind, 689 P. 2d 53, 56 (Wash. 
1984). In effect, the court analyzed the case as if the Wash-
ington legislature had passed a private bill that awarded re-
spondent free tuition to pursue religious studies. 
3 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 7, this conclusion does 
not depend on the fact that respondent appears to be the only handicapped 
student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious training. 
Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller ultimately flowed to religious insti-
tutions. Compare Mueller, supra, at 401, with id. , at 405 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). Nevertheless, the aid was thus channeled by individual par-
ents and not by the state, making the tax deduction permissible under the 
"primary effect" test of Lemon. 
' ' ~I 
,, .. 1 
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Such an analysis conflicts with both common sense and es-
tablished precedent. 4 Now here in Mueller did we analyze 
the effect of Minnesota's tax deduction on the parents who 
were parties to the case; rather, we looked to the nature and 
consequences of the program viewed as a whole. Mueller, 
supra, at 397-400. The same is true of our evaluation of the 
tuition reimbursement programs at issue in Nyquist, supra, 
at 780-789, and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 830-832 
(1973). See also Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 
243-244, 248 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 17 (1954). This is the appropriate perspective for 
this case as well. 5 Viewed in the proper light, the Washing-
ton program easily satisfies the second prong of the Lemon 
test. 
I agree, for the reasons stated by the Court, that the 
State's program has a secular purpose, and that no entangle-
ment challenge is properly raised on this record. I therefore 
join the Court's judgment. On the understanding that noth-
ing we do today lessens the authority of our decision in 
Mueller, I join the Court's opinion as well. 
4 Under the Washington Supreme Court's approach, the government 
could never provide aid of any sort to one who would use it for religious 
purposes, no matter what the characteristics of the challenged program. 
This Court has never taken such an approach. Walz v. Tax Commission, 
397 U. S. 664 (1970); see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16 
(1954). 
6 The perspective may be different in cases in which the State directly 
aids religious institutions. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 742-743 
(1973); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 755 
(1976) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). The danger that aid will, in effect, 
place the State's imprimatur on a particular religious group is much 
greater in such cases than when "numerous, private choices" of individual 
beneficiaries stand between the State and any benefit to religion. See 
Mueller, supra, at 399. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2497 
(1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (Lemon "requires courts to 
examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The Court's omission of Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 
(1983), from its analysis may mislead courts and litigants by 
suggesting that Mueller is somehow inapplicable to cases 
such as this one. 1 I write separately to emphasize that 
Mueller strongly supports the result we reach today. 
As the Court states, the central question in this case is 
whether Washington's provision of aid to handicapped stu-
dents has the "principal or primary effect" of advancing reli-
gion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). See 
also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 783-785 n. 39 (1973). Mueller makes the answer clear: 
state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational 
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do 
not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, 2 
because any aid to religion results from the private choices of 
' The Court offers no explanation for omitting Mueller from its substan-
tive discussion. Indeed, save for a single citation on a phrase with no sub-
stantive import whatever, ante, at 4, Mueller is not even mentioned. 
2 Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973): 
"The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic bene-
fit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an in-
centive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a re-
ward for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve 
and support religion-oriented institutions." 
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individual beneficiaries. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 398-399. 
Thus, in Mueller, we sustained a tax deduction for certain 
educational expenses, even though the great majority of 
beneficiaries were parents of children attending sectarian 
schools. I d., at 401. We noted the state's traditionally 
broad taxing authority, id., at 396, but the decision rested 
principally on two other factors. First, the deduction was 
equally available to parents of public school children and par-
ents of children attending private schools. I d., at 397; see 
Nyquist, supra, at 782-783 n. 38. Second, any benefit tore-
ligion resulted from the "numerous, private choices of indi-
vidual parents of school-age children." Mueller, supra, at 
399. 
The state program at issue here provides aid to handi-
capped students when their studies are likely to lead to em-
ployment. Aid does not depend on whether the student 
wishes to attend a public university or a private college, nor 
does it turn on whether the student seeks training for a reli-
gious or a secular career. It follows that under Mueller the 
state's program does not have the "principal or primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion. 3 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion because it found that the program had the practical 
effect of aiding religion in this particular case. Witters v. 
State Commission for the Blind, 689 P. 2d 53, 56 (Wash. 
1984). In effect, the court analyzed the case as if the Wash-
ington legislature had passed a private bill that awarded re-
spondent free tuition to pursue religious studies. 
3 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 7, this conclusion does 
not depend on the fact that respondent appears to be the only handicapped 
student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious training. 
Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller ultimately flowed to religious insti-
tutions. Compare Mueller, supra, at 401, with id., at 405 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). Nevertheless, the aid was thus channeled by individual par-
ents and not by the state, making the tax deduction permissible under the 
"primary effect" test of Lemon. 
84-1070-CONCUR 
WITTERS v. WASH. DEPT. OF SERVICES FOR BLIND 3 
Such an analysis conflicts with both common sense and es-
tablished precedent. 4 Nowhere in Mueller did we analyze 
the effect of Minnesota's tax deduction on the parents who 
were parties to the case; rather, we looked to the nature and 
consequences of the program viewed as a whole. Mueller, 
supra, at 397-400. The same is true of our evaluation of the 
tuition reimbursement programs at issue in Nyquist, supra, 
at 780-789, and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 830-832 
(1973). See also Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 
243-244, 248 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 \ f1 • 5 cVV\~-\tt.d U. S. 1, 17 (1954). This is the appropriate perspective for 
this case as well. Viewed in the proper light, the Washing-
ton program easily satisfies the second prong of the Lemon 
test. 
I agree·, for the reasons stated by the Court, that the 
State's program has a secular purpose, and that no entangle-
ment challenge is properly raised on this record. I therefore 
join the Court's judgment. On the understanding that noth-
ing we do today lessens the authority of our decision in 
Mueller, I join the Court's opinion as well. 
'Under the Washington Supreme Court's approach, the government 
could never provide aid of any sort to one who would use it for religious 
purposes, no matter what the characteristics of the challenged program. 
This Court has never taken such an approach. Walz v. Tax Commission, 










January 17, 1986 
Witters, No. 84-1070 
Your concurring opinion (circulated today) 
Justice Rehnquist 's law clerk spoke to me earlier 
today, and said that Justice Rehnquist would join your 
concurrence if you dropped footnote 5. That is the 
footnote that distinguishes Hunt v. McNair and Roemer v. 
Maryland Public Works Board, both of which state that 
"primary effect" is to be determined based on the 
particular case before the court. Currently, footnote 5 
says that Hunt and Roemer are distinguishable because they 
involved aid to religious institutions, not to 
individuals, the idea being that aid to institutions 
carries greater Establishment Clause concerns. 
As 1 understand his view, Justice Rehnquist feels 
strongly that the relevant language in Hunt (which you 
wrote) and Roemer is simply wrong, and that the primary 
effect of ~program has to be assessed by looking at the 
whole program. -- ---------~~~ 
could leave the ut, but I'm concerned 
n respond by citing Hunt and 
Roemer in the Court opinion. You would then be forced to 
respond, and would be in exactly the same position all 
over again. 
1 think there may be an alternative. The language 
that offends Justice Rehnquist might be seen as dicta, 
because the Court found no Establishment Clause violation 
in Hunt and Roemer. lf you distinguished the cases that 
way it wouldn't imply approval of their broad language, 
and Justice Rehnquist might join. The substitute footnote 
I have in mind would look something like this: 
There is contrary language in Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u.s. 734, 742-743 (1973), and Roemer v. 
Maryland Public Works Board, 426 u.s. 736, 755 
(1976) (opinion of BLACKMON, J.). Hunt and 
Roemer have no application here, however. 
Neither case found an Establishment Clause 
violation, so that the narrowed focus they 
employed may be viewed as an analytical short-
cut: if the State's program did not advance 
religion in the particular case that prompted 
the constitutional challenge, it clearly could 
not have advanced religion when viewed as a 
whole. In addition, both cases involved aid to 
religious institutions and not individuals. 
They do not, therefore, alter the analysis 
employed in Nyquist, Sloan, and Mueller, all of 
which involved aid to individuals, and all of 
which determined the effect of the relevant 
program by viewing it as a whole. 
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January 20, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1070, Witters v. Washington Department 
of Services for the Blind 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1070 
LARRY WITTERS, PETITIONER v. WASHINGTON 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WASHINGTON 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring. 
The Court's omission of Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 
(1983), from its analysis may mislead courts and litigants by 
suggesting that Mueller is somehow inapplicable to cases 
such as this one. 1 I write separately to emphasize that 
Mueller strongly supports the result we reach today. 
As the Court states, the central question in this case is 
whether Washington's provision of aid to handicapped stu-
dents has the "principal or primary effect" of advancing reli-
gion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). See 
also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 783-785, n. 39 (1973). Mueller makes the answer clear: 
state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational 
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do 
not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, 2 
1 The Court offers no explanation for omitting Mueller from its substan-
tive discussion. Indeed, save for a single citation on a phrase with no sub-
stantive import whatever, ante, at 4, Mueller is not even mentioned. 
2 Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973): 
"The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic bene-
fit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an 
incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a 
reward for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to pre-
serve and support religion-oriented institutions." 
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because any aid to religion results from the private choices of 
individual beneficiaries. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 398-399. 
Thus, in Mueller, we sustained a tax deduction for certain 
educational expenses, even though the great majority of 
beneficiaries were parents of children attending sectarian 
schools. Id., at 401. We noted the state's traditionally 
broad taxing authority, id., at 396, but the decision rested 
principally on two other factors. First, the deduction was 
equally available to parents of public school children and par-
ents of children attending private schools. Id., at 397; see 
Nyquist, supra, at 782-783, n. 38. Second, any benefit to 
religion resulted from the "numerous, private choices of 
individual parents of school-age children." Mueller, supra, 
at 399. 
The state program at issue here provides aid to handi-
capped students when their studies are likely to lead to 
employment. Aid does not depend on whether the student 
wishes to attend a public university or a private college, nor 
does it turn on whether the student seeks training for a reli-
gious or a secular career. It follows that under Mueller the 
state's program does not have the "principal or primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion. 3 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion because it found that the program had the practical 
effect of aiding religion in this particular case. Witters v. 
State Commission for the Blind, 689 P. 2d 53, 56 (Wash. 
1984). In effect, the court analyzed the case as if the Wash-
ington legislature had passed a private bill that awarded 
respondent free tuition to pursue religious studies. 
3 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 7, this conclusion does 
not depend on the fact that respondent appears to be the only handicapped 
student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious training. 
Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller ultimately flowed to religious insti-
tutions. Compare Mueller, supra, at 401, with id., at 405 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). Nevertheless, the aid was thus channeled by individual par-
ents and not by the state, making the tax deduction permissible under the 
"primary effect" test of Lemon. 
.. 
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Such an analysis conflicts with both common sense and es-
tablished precedent. 4 Nowhere in Mueller did we analyze 
the effect of Minnesota's tax deduction on the parents who 
were parties to the case; rather, we looked to the nature and 
consequences of the program viewed as a whole. Mueller, 
supra, at 397-400. The same is true of our evaluation of the 
tuition reimbursement programs at issue in Nyquist, supra, 
at 780-789, and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 830-832 
(1973). See also Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 
243-244, 248 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 17 (1954). This is the appropriate perspective for 
this case as well. Viewed in the proper light, the Washing-
ton program easily satisfies the second prong of the Lemon 
test. 
I agree, for the reasons stated by the Court, that the 
State's program has a secular purpose, and that no entangle-
ment challenge is properly raised on this record. I therefore 
join the Court's judgment. On the understanding that noth-
ing we do today lessens the authority of our decision in 
Mueller, I join the Court's opinion as well. 
• Under the Washington Supreme Court's approach, the government 
could never provide aid of any sort to one who would use it for religious 
purposes, no matter what the characteristics of the challenged program. 
This Court has never taken such an approach. Walz v. Tax Commission, 
397 U. S. 664 (1970); see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16 
(1954). 
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No. 84-1070 
LARRY WITTERS, PETITIONER v. WASHINGTON 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WASHINGTON 
[January ' 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and i 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring. I 
The Court's omission of Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 
(1983), from its analysis may mislead courts and litigants by 
suggesting that Mueller is somehow inapplicable to cases 
such as this one. 1 I write separately to emphasize that 
Mueller strongly supports the result we reach today. 
As the Court states, the central question in this case is 
whether Washington's provision of aid to handicapped stu-
dents has the "principal or primary effect" of advancing reli-
gion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). See 
also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 783-785, n. 39 (1973). Mueller makes the answer clear: 
state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational 
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do 
not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, 2 
1 The Court offers no explanation for omitting Mueller from its substan-
tive discussion. Indeed, save for a single citation on a phrase with no sub-
stantive import whatever, ante, at 4, Mueller is not even mentioned. 
2 Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973): 
"The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic bene-
fit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an 
incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a 
reward for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to pre-
serve and support religion-oriented institutions." 
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because any aid to religion results from the private choices of 
individual beneficiaries. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 398-399. 
Thus, in Mueller, we sustained a tax deduction for certain 
educational expenses, even though the great majority of 
beneficiaries were parents of children attending sectarian 
schools. Id., at 401. We noted the state's traditionally 
broad taxing authority, id., at 396, but the decision rested 
principally on two other factors. First, the deduction was 
equally available to parents of public school children and par-
ents of children attending private schools. Id., at 397; see 
Nyquis~'ff#, at 782-783, n. 38. Second, any benefit to 
religion resulted from the "numerous, private choices of 
individual parents of school-age children." Mueller, supra, 
at 399. 
The state program at issue here provides aid to handi-
capped students when their studies are likely to lead to 
employment. Aid does not depend on whether the student 
wishes to attend a public university or a private college, nor 
does it turn on whether the student seeks training for a reli-
gious or a secular career. It follows that under Mueller the 
state's program does not have the "principal or primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion. 3 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion because it found that the program had the practical 
effect of aiding religion in this pap,icular case. W~ v 
State Commission for the Blind,A6_89 P. 2d 53, 56 CWasa!" 
1984). In effect, the court analyzed the case as if the Wash-
ington legislature had passed a private bill that awarded 
respondent free tuition to pursue religious studies. 
8 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 7, this conclusion does 
not depend on the fact that respondent appears to be the only handicapped 
student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious training. 
Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller ultimately flowed to religious insti-
tutions. Compare M'tl;eller;;{mptra, at 40-lf with id., at 405 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). Nevertheless, the aid was thus channeled by individual par-
ents and not by the state, making the tax deduction permissible under the 
"primary effect" test of Lemon. 
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Such an analysis conflicts with both common sense and es-
tablished precedent. 4 Now here in Mueller did we analyze 
the effect of Minnesota's tax deduction on the parents who 
were parties to the case; rather, we looked to the nature and 
consequences of the program viewed as a whole. Mueller, 
supra, at 397-400. The same is true of our evaluation of the 
tuition reimbursement programs at issue in Nyquist, supra, 
at 780-789, and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 830-832 
(1973). See also Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 
243-244, 248 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
lb- . S. 1, 17 (1954). This is the appropriate perspective for 
this case as well. Viewed in the proper light, the Washing-
ton program easily satisfies the second prong of the Lemon 
test. 
I agree, for the reasons stated by the Court, that the 
State's program has a secular purpose, and that no entangle-
ment challenge is properly raised on this record. I therefore 
join the Court's judgment. On the understanding that noth-
ing we do today lessens the authority of our decision in 
Mueller, I join the Court's opinion as well. 
4 Under the Washington Supreme Court's approach, the government 
could never provide aid of any sort to one who would use it for religious 
purposes, no matter what the characteristics ~e challenged progra~ Se-2. 
This Court has never taken such an approach. ). Walz v. Tax Commission, 
397 U. S. 664 (1970); JEverson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16 
(1954) . 
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O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment and concurring 
in part. 
I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion, and concur in 
the judgment. I also agree with the Court that both the pur-
pose and effect of Washington's program of aid to handi-
capped students are secular. ·As JusTICE POWELL's sepa-
rate opinion persuasively argues, the Court's opinion in 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), makes clear that 
"state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educa-
tional assistance to a class defined without reference to reli-
gion do not violate the second part of the Lemon v. 
Kurtzman test, because any aid to religion results from the 
private decisions of beneficiaries." Ante, at 1-2 (POWELL, 
J., concurring) (footnote omitted). The aid to religion at 
issue here is the result of petitioner's private choice. No 
reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us 
an inference that the state itself is endorsing a religious prac-
tice or belief. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 690 
(1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
.. 
.... . ' 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1070 
LARRY WITTERS, PETITIONER v. WASHINGTON 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WASHINGTON 
[January 27, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring. 
The Court's omission of Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 
(1983), from its analysis may mislead courts and litigants by 
suggesting that Mueller is somehow inapplicable to cases 
such as this one. 1 I write separately to emphasize that 
Mueller strongly supports the result we reach today. 
As the Court states, the central question in this case is 
whether Washington's provision of aid to handicapped stu-
dents has the "principal or primary effect" of advancing reli-
gion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). See 
also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 783-785, n. 39 (1973). Mueller makes the answer clear: 
state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational 
assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do 
not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, 2 
1 The Court offers no explanation for omitting Mueller from its substan-
tive discussion. Indeed, save for a single citation on a phrase with no sub-
stantive import whatever, ante, at 4, Mueller is not even mentioned. 
2 Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973): 
"The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic bene-
fit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an 
incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a 
reward for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to 
preserve and support religion-oriented institutions." 
• 
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because any aid to religion results from the private choices of 
individual beneficiaries. Mueller, 463 U. S., at 398-399. 
Thus, in Mueller, we sustained a tax deduction for certain 
educational expenses, even though the great majority of 
beneficiaries were parents of children attending sectarian 
schools. I d., at 401. We noted the state's traditionally 
broad taxing authority, id., at 396, but the decision rested 
principally on two other factors. First, the deduction was 
equally available to parents of public school children and par-
ents of children attending private schools. I d., at 397; see 
Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 782-783, n. 38. Second, any benefit 
to religion resulted from the "numerous, private choices of 
individual parents of school-age children." Mueller, supra, 
at 399. 
The state program at issue here provides aid to handi-
capped students when their studies are likely to lead to 
employment. Aid does not depend on whether the student 
wishes to attend a public university or a private college, nor 
does it turn on whether the student seeks training for a reli-
gious or a secular career. It follows that under Mueller the 
state's program does not have the "principal or primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion. 3 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion because it found that the program had the practical 
effect of aiding religion in this particular case. Witters v. 
State Commission for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 628-629, 
689 P. 2d 53, 56 (1984). In effect, the court analyzed the 
case as if the Washington legislature had passed a private bill 
3 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 7, this conclusion does 
not depend on the fact that respondent appears to be the only handicapped 
student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue religious training. 
Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller ultimately flowed to religious insti-
tutions. Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 401 (1983), with id., at 
405 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the aid was thus chan-
neled by individual parents and not by the state, making the tax deduction 
permissible under the "primary effect" test of Lemon. 
• v 
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that awarded respondent free tuition to pursue religious 
studies. 
Such an analysis conflicts with both common sense and es-
tablished precedent. 4 Nowhere in Mueller did we analyze 
the effect of Minnesota's tax deduction on the parents who 
were parties to the case; rather, we looked to the nature and 
consequences of the program viewed as a whole. Mueller, 
supra, at 397-400. The same is true of our evaluation of the 
tuition reimbursement programs at issue in Nyquist, supra, 
at 780-789, and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 830-832 
(1973). See also Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 
243-244, 248 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 16-17 (1954). This is the appropriate perspective 
for this case as well. Viewed in the proper light, the Wash-
ington program easily satisfies the second prong of the 
Lemon test. 
I agree, for the reasons stated by the Court, that the 
State's program has a secular purpose, and that no entangle-
ment challenge is properly raised on this record. I therefore 
join the Court's judgment. On the understanding that noth-
ing we do today lessens the authority of our decision in 
Mueller, I join the Court's opinion as well. 
• Under the Washington Supreme Court's approach, the government 
could never provide aid of any sort to one who would use it for religious 
purposes, no matter what the characteristics of the challenged program. 
This Court has never taken such an approach. See Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16 
(1954). 
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